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holars Roundtable participants discussed a wide range of appi
to understanding and limiting the ever-increasing sprawl of trademark rights. It was
productive and stimul aing discussion. In this essay, I would like to combine some of M,
own ideas with points a nd suggestions made by the other participants, to sketch out a Possibl<
judicial approach to re gulating the sprawl. Before discussing a potential solution, how
is important to underst and the nature of the Droblem, and some of itS Drimary causes.
The Trademark Sc

Section I will discuss the problem and set the stage for my proposal. Section IIwill
then suggest that courts rielegate certain particularly problematic new forms of trademark
infringement claims to a "passing off/associational marketing" evaluation. It will anchor
this proposal in the histor- c development of the common law and courts' construction of the
Lanham Act, and then ex lore some of the rules, presumptions and defenses that might cabin
this more limited cause of action.
The Problem
The courts developed trademark law to serve a limited purpose: to facilitate efficient

competition by enabling merchants to adopt a particular word or symbol to identify their
goods, and prevent other merchants from using a confusingly similar word or symbol to
identify their own goods, when doing so would be likely to cause mistaken purchases. These

limited rights in words and symbols ensure that consumers can easily and quickly identify
and distinguish the goods of competing producers and effectively exercise their purchasing
preferences. This reduces consumer search costs and enables consumers to reward quality
through repeat patronase. The potential for repeat Datronaee in turn, enables producers to
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However, courts recognized that overprotection of marks can actually undercut marketplace
competition and efficiency by enabling mark owners to interfere unnecessarily with the flow
of useful marketplace information to consumers. Overly broad rights in marks may prevent
competing producers from effectively communicating the nature, qualities and characteristics
of their own products to interested consumers, or prevent competitors, consumers or the
media from engaging in critical product critiques and commentary. Overly broad protection
of marks may prevent or unnecessarily complicate development of new digital technologies
that assist consumers and promote competition by enhancing or aggregating available product
information. Overly broad protection of marks may enable mark owners to prevent competitors
from selling similar unpatented products and erect other barriers to market entry. Moreover,
rights in marks may intrude impermissibly on the public's First Amendment interests in
freedom of speech. Toensure that harmful overprotection would not occur, courts built a
number of limiting doctrines into the infringement cause of action, and have invoked a range
of external limitations as well.

Thus, trademark law is best understood as a careful balance of competing marketplace
interests. Nonetheless, over the years, the scope of trademark protection has gradually but

steadily expanded. Under modern marketing practices, marks have grown from symbols
to enable consumers to differentiate products to sophisticated selling tools, the subject of

tremendous investment and careful, expert sculpting. Mark owners have come to view marks
as vital business assets in themselves-"brands" that encompassand convey not just source,
but a whole construct of compelling imagery, prestige, personality, and hooks to facilitate
consumer self-identification with the product and thus cement brand loyalty.
Where investment goes, an inherent sense of property right tends to follow, regardless of
what black-letter law has to say about it. The notion of property arises from a deep-seated (if
perhaps misguided) sense of morality: if a person invests, then he should reap the full benefit
of the investment. To many neole it seems intrinsically unfair for others to sinhn off benefit
romote the o
ublic good
iding feels uncomfortabl
even when doing so mi
like theft. So as marks t ke on psychological attributes of property (by virtue of their owners
investment), additional notions of actionable harm come to the fore. As Mark Lemley
succinctly put it: If any ialue that arises from use or reference to a mark should belong to the
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use or reference without paying for a license. Nevel mind that the use caused no consumers
to make mistaken purchases, and may actually have promoted consumer interests in price and
quality competition, orconstituted First Amendment protected expression.
Mark owners communicate their attitudes about investment and property to courts and
the public: Investments need to be protected, and perhaps more harm, beyond undercutting
consumer reliance interests and deprivation of license revenue, arises from unauthorized
use of marks. Others' unauthorized use or reference to the mark may create new, unwanted
consumer associations with the mark, may distort or diminish the carefully cultivated brand
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identity, may undercut the carefully honed aura of exclusivity and uniqueness. To protec1
their investment, many mark owners would like complete contro l over use of their word o
symbol. Concerns arise: if mark owners can't have the desired co ntrol over their marks, they
may not invest in brand differentiation, or even in innovative new vroducts and services.
The complicating factor, of course, is that such expansive prc:pert, ignts in ords and
symbols is likely to cause the serious competition, technologiccal di elopment and First
Amendment harms identified above in the discussion of overprot e,.ction. Moreover, as Ralph
Brown explained in 1948 , all we really need in order to have an effficient, competitive market
is "information as to source," so that consumers can assign good will or blame to the proper
producer and repeat satisfactory purchases. All the additional hyp e and imagery of a "brand"
is of questionable public benefit. And as the Supreme Court has re peatedly stressed, Congress
designed the patent and copyright laws, not trademark law, to pr ovide economic incentives
tive endeavors.2
Overly
broad
construction
of
trademark
lav
to invest
undercu t the effectiveness of Congress' innovation and investment-inducing st itegies undc
the Pate nt and C(0l
cts.
Notwithstanding such practical conside rations, however, the inherent, emotionally Bsonant
sense of property has slowly but steadi ly influenced (and continues to influence courts'
decision-making process in trademark i nfringement cases. It has lead courts repe edly to
extend the scOpe of actionable "likelihoo d of confusion."
Initially, the only actionable confusion was confusion about product source,

Vhich

could

lead consumers to buy the defendant's product, thinking it was the plaintiff's.

learly such
confusion is harmful, as it undercuts consumers' ability to rely on marks fof nformation
about product source (which in turn enables them to infer product quality and chc acteristics),

and thus intelligently exercise their urchasing

references. And the resultin inability of
owners incentive to invest -innrocnc
quality. Courts later extended infringement liability to uses of marks that c
da likelihood
of consumer confusion about whether the mark owner sponsored the defe rdant's r oduct or
whether the parties were affiliated.As Mark McKenna and Mark Lemley point out there is
some practical justification for this: as producers began to grow and diver sify, and icense or
nirchasers to i

I

satisfyin nurchases undercutsrm

aueiuints

ui

ulnruu

IFat the defendant's product
predict
SmrdS
has quality or characteristics they associate with the ma rk ownei rand mistakenly purchase a
product that lacks those attributes. This harms consume rs, and, :o the extent that consumers
use of the mark might cause consumers mistakenly to

11

1. Ralph Brown, Advertisi
1180-81 (1948).

ifFix Devices,

2. See, e.g., Dastar Corp.
Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
3. Mark A. Lemley &Marl
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rand charac1 stics,
to invest in roduct

hold the mark owner responsible for the defendant's unsatisfactory qu
this may injure the mark owner's reputation and undercut its incent
quality.

However, a mistak en belief about "sponsorshil 0r r"attiliation " is only harmful frc
societal standpoint if consumers rely on it to m
issumptions about product qualit o0
characteristics. Absen it reliance for such qualityed informat ion, confusion about
existence of a license agreement, in particular, causes none of the harm that trademark law
traditionally has undertaken to address. Courts have nonetheless imposed infringement liability
for confusion about "sponsorship" or "affiliation" well beyond settings in which consumers
might rely on mistaken assumptions about relationship for substantive information about
product quality or characteristics. For example, courts have repeatedly relied on possible
consumer confusion about the existence of a license agreement to permit sports teams to

enjoin others' replication of their marks on the fronts of tee shirts and hats. It is unlikely that
consumers consider the possibility of a team license in evaluating the quality of the shirt or
hat. However, since good will for the sports team creates demand for the shirts, courts have
enabled the team mark owners (through their licensees) to monopolize the market for the shirts
and hats bearing team emblems, depriving consumers of the benefits of price competition.
Another example of th
ol
influence arises when mar owners seek to
j
ting products that
rip ose infringement liabimy on movie producers, for filmscenes depic
bea r identifiable marks. Mark owners often pay movie producers to depict their products and
mairks in films. Does possible confusion about whether that happened in a particular movie
just ify prohibiting movie producers from including an identifiable product i n a scene absent a
lice rse? Surely consumers will not rely on the presence of "Caterpillar" on a tractor depicted
in arn actionscene to assess the quality or characteristics of the film, or mista kenly buy theater
tick ets based on the assumption that the tractor mark owner oversaw a nd controlled the
---

ana

* -A-

lity of the film.However.many mark owners are motivated to try to con trol all denictions

of their mark. A movie s depiction of
may be inconsiste nt witth the image t]
undercut the mark owne r's investmen
Amendment inter ests in free artistic e-

ractor destroying pristine rain forest
nark owner1 nts the mark to convey. It may thus
ever mind t film producer's and the public's First
ssion.

'

Courts have al so expan ded the scope of actionable consumer confusion by
liability for "initia linterest( confusio n"-temporary confusion about whether the de
related to the mar k owner,t that is cleared up prior to any purchase transaction. Th
mistaken purchas es, becaust
nporarily confused consumers do not rely on
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intormation about the quality or characteristics of the product they ultimately buy. But the
notion of "p operty" in marks has influenced courts, to npose liability because the defendan
harnessed th e mark owner's good will briefly to b rin consumers to its doorstep, and giv
it the oppor tunity to make its own sales p litch. This constitutes free riding on the mar 5s
good will.( Courts have also based infringe nent liability on "post-sale confusion," wh
the purchas r knows exactly what she is bu ng, but persons encountering the product af
the purchas might confuse the defendant's product with the mark owner's. Such confusi on
e
may possibl y mislead the post-sale observe rs about the qualities and characteristics of the
mark owner 's products, and influence their purchase decisions at some uncertain point :in
the future. t ut perhaps more importantly, if prospective purchasers observe too many raink
and file per slons seemingly in poession of the mark owner's expensive product, this miay
undercut the mark owner's investment in cr atin an aura of mark Drestire and exclusivit)
Apart trom expanding what consumers may be con]t used about,gand the relevant timmng or their
confusion, courts have often strained to justify a fin ding of likeli hood of consumer co )nfusion
on exceedingly sparse and questionable evidence. Courts havve held that an infrinigement
plaintiff may successfully demonstrate an actionabl e likelihood of confusion through survey
evidence demonstrating that 10-15% of prospecti ve purchase rs may be confused . Some
decisions appear to find that no real likelihood of co nfusion need Ibe

demonstrated at a]ll,
defendant's reference to the plaintiff's mark might divert potent .ial sales.o

if the

Further impacting the traditional balance of competing interests, courts have lost sight of

the "trademark use" requirement, which traditionally served as a limitation on the reach of
mark owners' rights. At common law, the infringement plaintiff was required to demonstrate

that the defendant used its allegedly infringing word or symbol "as a mark," to indicate the
source of its own goods or services, before the issue of likelihood of confusion could be

reached. (Use "as a mark" entailed closely, directly associating the mark with the defendant's
oods or servicesr
in a manner that was nercentible to consumers and that consumers would
understand to indica te the source of those goods or services.) 9 This require .ment limited
the in fringement cause of action to commercial speech (which enjoys less Firs1 Amendment
protec tion) in most cases, and tended to limit infringement remedies to cases in which the
potenitial harm to consume r reliance interests justified the expenditure of judicia resources to
unut

take

further

investig

ation into likely consumer confusion. However, with,

the advent

of

the In ternet, courts have wVhittled down the "use" limitation to little more than a requirement
that ti e defendant use the Smark in a commercial context. They have imosed infringement
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1(

liability on defendants who neither of r nor advertise products or services, and against
references to marks that are complete- hidden from consumers, so that any meaningful
consumer reliance would be impossible
Other traditional limitations to the infringement cause of action have been gradually
undermined becaus courts have linked them to the ever-expanding likelihood of confusion
determination. For e xample, several Circuit Courts of Appeal held that the descriptive fair use
defense, codified in the Lanham Act 33(b)(4)," was available only when the defendant's
use caused no likel ihood of confusion. While the Supreme Court ultimately rejected this
construction ,13 10we r courts have continued to consider the likelihood of confusion as an
important factor in evaluating whether the defendant's use was descriptive and therefore
fair.1 Likewise, so me courts have tied the concept of permissive nominative fair use to the
absence of consumer~ confusion." The issue of likely consumer confusion is also entangled
in determining the lawfulness of using marks in comparative advertisingl16 and expressive
works ," and in appl,ying the doctrine of exhaustion."
T he highly su bjec

nature of the

hood of confusion d(

ination itself, combined
nses, makes it dif cut tor in tringem ent
gation. The prosp ct of exp ensive and

with this weaken ing of traditional i mitations and d(
defendants to di Smiss meritless cl aims early in 1
protracted litigat ion of the confusi on issue leads

iany (if not most) defendar ts to s(
overreaching infiringement claims, r, the r than contes t them. This furthe r reinror ces trademar
owners' control. Mark owners vigil intl y send out ce ase and desist lett ers to pi ersons
rakin
unauthorized ref erence to their ma -ks. While most mark owners und oubtedl y believe tha
the claims they assert in these let ers are viable u nder modern trad .emark precedent, th
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letters and threat of expensive, protracted litigation undoubtedly chill many non-infringing,
pro-competitive, and First Amendment-protected uses of words and symbols, making the
actual, real-world footprint of trademark protection even larger than that defined by case
precedent. And as Eric Goldman pointed out in the course of Roundtable discussion, the
business community's understanding of the limits of "safe" (non-letter inducing) use of
marks informs the private policies governing use and reference to trademarks that media and
Internet service providers such as Google, eBay, and Twitter adopt and impose on their users
as "private law."

We are left with a "feedback loop," which a number of Roundtable participants have
discussed at one time or another. The broader the rights trademark owners assert, the broader
consumers believe the rights to be. And the broader consumers believe the rights to be, the
more likely they will assume that third-party uses and references are licensed (as they are
"required" to be). This leads courts to find that unauthorized uses and references to marks
mislead consumers (by causing them to think that the mark owner must have licensed them
when it has not). Courts accordingly impose liability, which leads mark owners to assert even
broader rights, which leads consumers to think even more uses must be licensed, which leads
courts to find even more actionable consumer confusion.
As Barton Beebe noted at the Roundtable, we are losing sight of the purpose of protecting

trademarks: we have come to see likelihood of confusion, in itself, as the harm to be
addressed. But likelihood of confusion is only evidence of other possible harm, which should
be fully identified and weighed relative to competing interests. How can we escape this cycle,
which seems relentlessly to lead to increasingly stronger trademark rights, at the expense

of competition, First Amendment, and technological development interests? I advance the
followin proosal as one ossible approach.

onoset
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I would look to the hi stor icc l de velopme t of trademark law for inspirt ation, and sugge s1
th it courts revi ve and str ess the dist inction, long understood in both the co mmon aw and th
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f from the pa ssing off cause of action, and are ssentially specialized forms or subclasses
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)f action, see Dastar
is Assn. v. Blinded
Corp., 503 F. Supp.
761 cmt. a (1938);

t

rights in words or symbols. 1 focuses strictly on the defendant's conduct and th

1tirm

otent

rarketplace harm it may caust

infringement cases clearly fall outside the traditional boundal s ot
trademark law and cause most of our current "sprawl-related" problems: 1) cases cl1
only confusion about sponsorship or a license agreement, where consumers are unli ely to
rely on sponsorship or affiliation for information about product quality or characterist ecs; 2)
cases in which the defendant has not made a "trademark use" of the plaintiff's mark; 3' cases
involving initial interest confusion or post-sale confusion; and 4) cases alleging infring ement
through non-commercial speech. I suggest that courts evaluate these cases not as infring ement
claims, but as a different category of passing off. This might serve to focus the evaluat ion on
factors other than the plaintiff's ownership interest in an indication of origin, invite a omore
careful evaluation of the actual nature and mr
defendant's acts pose to
ude of harm
Four classes of

the niintiff', invPctmPnt
This would also afford an opportunit y to impos e limits on liability that may not be needed
in more tr aditional infringement con texts. To e mphasize the distinction, one might simply
characteriz e these non-traditional tra demark claiims as "passing off" claims. However, since
trademark iinfringement is generally vviewed as a -part of the larger cause of action for passing
the market]

ie,

and minimize the inherent u

on, it mignt oe more userui to aevise a new n

a separate and distinct subclass of the passin

and false advertising. I would propose the na

n

cimn,

nmti:

me or iese claims, to empnasi
rze ra
in
off group, apart from tradema rk infringe ment
associational marketing" fo the
Vr new class
ne

of passing off claims.
in the Restatements

The Restatement of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of Unfai Competit
generally understood to restate the common law as it existed at the ime of the

,

which a

>ublication

provide a rough template for my proposal. They each recogniz< a residua l categor

Ly

"passing off" claims that fall outside the boundariesof trademark, t de name, and trader
infringement. They both impose greater limitations on these residuc 1 "passing off" caus
action than they impose on infringement claims.

s of

o

The Restatement of Torts, published in 1938, devoted Chapter 35, entitled "Confusion
of Source," to the topic at hand. It divided the chapter into three distinct subtopics: 1)

"Fraudulent Marketing;" 2) "Infringement of Trade-Mark and Trade N ame;" and 3) "Imitation
of Appearance of Goods." The Introductory Note explained that whil eall three subtopics had
their foundation in the historical concept of "passing off," the Americ an Law Institute (ALI)
and
trade
differentiated them because "[t]he protection given to the interest in trade-marks
names, and, under certain conditions, to the interest in the physica l appearance of goods
transcends that given under the narrower conception of "passing o/ ff." 20 Trademark, trade
1'
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cled).

dress, and trade name protection are premised on affirmative, albeit limited, ownership rights
in words or symbols. At the time the Restatement of Torts was drafted, there was general
consensus that the plaintiff should no longer be required to demonstrate the defendant's
fraudulent intent in trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement cases.21 However,
the ALI recognized that the fraudulent intent requirement should remain in place for claims
of passing off that did not constitute infringement of protected indications of origin. The
Restatement denominated this residual category of passing off claims "fraudulent marketing."

The Restatement defined "fraudulent marketing" as making a "fraudulent statement" that the
speaker is another person, or is the other person's agent or successor, or that the goods or services
the speaker is marketing were produced, processed, designed, or distributed by the other. The
accompanying comments elaborated that an actionable fraudulent misrepresentation could

take any form and be made in any manner "calculated to communicate its meaning."23 No
use of a protected trademark, trade name, or trade dress was required. Liability for fraudulent
marketing required that the speaker act for the purpose of inducing persons to purchase his

goods or services, and that the circumstances be such that consumers would likely rely on

the misstatement to the commercial detriment of the plaintiff.2 This requirement of likely
consumer reliance was essentially a requirement that the misrepresentation be material to

consumer purchase decisions.25
In 1995 , when the ALI undertook to draft the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,
the law had further evolved to the point that fraudulent intent was no longer viewed as
an appropriate prerequisite even for this residual category of

passing off cases that the

Restatement ofTorts had identified as "Fraudulent Marketing."26 The Restatement of Unfair
Competition retained the residual category, but dropped the "Fraudulent Marketing" title
and designated the category as a form of "deceptive marketing." It stressed the distinction
between "deceptive marketing" and infringement of protected indications of origin,
emphasizing that even though infringement claims might literally fall under the definition of
"deceptive marketing," they should be brought pursuant to the sections specifically dealing
with trademark, trade name, and trade dress infringement, and not under the rules set forth
for deceptive marketing.27

21. See Margreth Barrett, Reconciling FairUse and Trademark Use, 28 CARDOZOARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2010).
22. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS supra note 19, 712.
23. Id. at cmt. d.
24. Id.§ 712 (emphasis added).

25.16Section
712 defined actionable harm, or "commercial
detriment,"
tom.f
include direct
diversion of sales,
when
RETAEMN (HRD
ur
oe1,2
m.d
1FUFI
1PTTON
the parties27.Id.at
compete.
cm. b It explained that when the parties did not compete, actionable harm took the form of injury
to the business reputation of the plaintiff's goods: "If the persons likely to rely on the actor's misrepresentation
are also likely to deal with the [plaintiff] or to purchase his goods, they may be dissuaded from doing so if their
experience with the actor's goods is unpleasant." Id. at cmt. g.
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The ALI categorized false adi tsin passing ott, and reverse passing off together, as
specific forms of "deceptive marl ing,' in their own ch tapter.2In doing so, it characterized
the residual passing off cause cr action as more ner ly akin to the cause of action for
false advertising (which was no w more generally acce pted than it had been in 1938) than
to trademark, trade name or tra de dress infringement. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition's "Deceptive Marke ting" chapter provides general principles" applicable to all
the delineated forms of deceptive marketing in§ 2 and 3, then addresses special subcategories
of deceptive marketin rincludin Da
assine off, in § 4 and reverse Dassinr off, in§ 5.
Section 2 defines "deceptive marketing" as making a rep resentation relating to goods,
services, or commercial activities, in the course of marketing them, that is likely to deceive
or mislead prospective purchasers to the likely commerci al detriment of another. The
comments stress that the cause of action for deceptive market ing only avplies to commercial
speech
29 and
that
liability
may
only
be imposed if the
decepti
oncis 'to the likely commercia
-nisrepresentation will be
nt" of the person seeking relief."30 Sec tion 3 provides
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The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition thus should be understood as prol iding
a cause of action for "residual" passing off claims that do not turn on infringement of valid
trademark, trade name, or trade dress rights and impose liability on a more conser
basis-requiring a specific demonstration of commercial detriment (and materiality), a' as1
when the defendant's misrepresentation does not communicate that the plaintiff is thes
rce
of the defendant's goods or services (or the information inherent in the source-th the
defendant's goods have the quality or characteristics of the plaintiff's).
BA Statutol

ich

Courts h e specifically construed Lanha m Act 43(a)32 to incorpo
not only the
of
unregistered
common-la cause of action for infringemen
tr ademarks, ide names, and
trade dress', ut also the "residual" common-l w cause of action for passing 0 ff, as descr ibed
t
i C
ment of Torts and The Restateme
It r ompetwrt. III 1-lmm,
h C entury Fox Film Corp., the Supreme Court explained that 43(a) goes
C(
infringement" to redress other forms of false designation of origin,
beyond tradem
se or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which
. is likely to caus e confusion ... as to the origin ... of . . . goods or services."34 The
a)urt cautioned that " 43(a) does not have boundless applica tion as a remedy for unfair
de practices." Rat her, 43(a) "prohibits actions like tradema rk infringement that deceive
consumers and impa ir a producer's goodwill." The Court noted that the Lanham Act should
be read "in acc ordan ce with the Act's common-law foundation s," and (consistent with the
Restatement's "comnmercial detriment"/materiality requirement) stressed that "the words of
the Lanham Ac t shou ld not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence
to consumers." 5 TV DastarCourt also made it clear that the residual passing o cause of
action should bc
:d carefully, in a manner that accommodates com
reting
interests in free
nitations, and public colic

competition, constitution
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11

Cases denominated "passing off" under modern common law and Lanham Act
3(a) do
not focus on the plaintiff's proprietary rights in a mark or other indication of origin, or on the
defendant's use of protected words or symbols, as such. Rather, they focus on determining
whether the defendant's actions, under the specific circumstances of the case, will have the
impact of misrepresenting the source, sponsorship or affiliation of its products or services
and thus confusing consumers. For example, a number of "passing off" cases have addressed
situations in which the defendant uses the same generic word as the plaintiff to identify its
product or service. They have held that use of the same generic word, in itself, will not
constitute passing off, but a showing of additional acts or omissions on the defendant's part
may. For example, if the defendant is a later entrant to the field, courts may find that it has an
affirmative obligation to enable consumers to distinguish its goods from the plaintiff's-by
clearly labeling its products, adding additional, distinguishing words or symbols, adopting
dissimilar packaging or marketing materials, or by providing disclaimers. Or courts may
enioin the later-usinr

defendant from takin

affirmative actions that aeravate the likelihood

of conrusion crea d through use of the sam generic words or si nbols such s reter in
to its products as genuine," or "the original, or duplicating the aintiff's cat( o or st

numbers.36
in ofner cases courts nave
rounO acuona

ole passmng ont wnen ine aierenoiant rmsrepresentea

itself as the plaintiff's agent, thereby caus ing a likelihood of confusion about the plaintiff's
"affiliation with the defendant, or its spo nsorship, or approval of the defendant's business
activities."37 r rother example, a court f ound that the plaintiff (who advertised its product
heavily on television) stated a 43(a) pa ssing off claim against a defendant (who did little
television advertising), when the defenda nt promoted its competing product "as advertised
on TV."38 COurts have relied on Lanham Act 43(a) to find actionable passing off when a
defendant reproduced non-trademark aspe cts of the plaintiff's personal identity in marketing
its products or services a lorm or raise representation of endorsement. In addition, they
have found that substitu tion cases (wh re the customer orders plaintiff's brand, but the
defendant silently supplie s defendant's f roduct instead) can constitute "passing off" under

es s(

d 1035, 1H
cl Co., Inc
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80:9
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Thus, just as in
, Lanham Act 43(a) provides both a cause of action for
infringement of ur nregistered indicat ions of origin and a cause of action for a residual category
of "passing off" claims (that do no t involve use of protected indications of origin). As in
common law, "res idual" passing off no longer requires that the defendant act with fraudulent
intent. Many of the decisions do not expressly discuss the issue of materiality. In most cases,
it is unnecessary to do so, because the alleged misrepresentation suggests that the plaintiff
is the source of the defendant's product or service, and materiality can be assumed. The
Supreme Court's decision in the Dastar case nonetheless suggests that materiality remains
a highly relevant element in evaluating claims that deviate from that traditional scenario.
And there is precedent, in addition to the Restatements, for imposing an express materiality
requirement. For example, in King v. Ames,4 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
a 43(a) passing off claim on the ground that the alleged misrepresentation would not be
material to purchasers. In King, the daughter of a deceased blues singer sued the defendant,
oF i i i named himself as "producer" on the bach of CDs of the blues sineer's live
recordings. In r ejecting the reverse passing off claim the
ircuit expressl) required
that the dei nd nt's misrepresentation be material-tend to influ rnce consumers' purchase
decisions- is a precondition to passing off liability.
vIV YTODOSeG L
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As noted supra, I would rel egate tour classes or cl aims now brought and evaluated as
'trademark infringement" to ev aluation as a form of residual p assing off claim, pursuant
to Lanham Act 43(a). For efficiency. I would call th ese claims "oassinr off/associational
narketing" claims. They include
1. Intringement claims involving confusion over rn<
relationship between the parties, when consumers are ntlKely to took to rne supposed
relationshipfor concrete information aboutproduct quai V or charatteristics.T his category

of cases would look much like the category of cases tha
describe in their "Irrelevant Confusion" article,2 and foi
a materialitV Drereauisite to recovery.
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Infringement claims in which th

Ie

7t

This would include Internet infringement cases in which the defendant has made a hidden
reference to the plaintiff's mark (for example, in web site metatags or as a key word to trigger

advertising), to which consumers are not exposed. It would also include cases in which the
defendantdoes not closely associate the allegedly infringing word or symbol with goods or
services that it is marketing, so that consumers are unlikely to understand the use as indicating
the source of the defendant's goods or services-for example Internet cases in which the
defendant incorporates the plaintiff's mark into its domain name, or features the mark on its

web site, but does not sell or advertise goods or services on the web site.
3. Infrinement claims in which

rs allegin

ngement through

sec0h. For this purpose I would stress t h:at the term "commercial speech" does not encompass
all speech made in a commercial con ext, or that has some connection with other speech

that is commercial.4 Rather, this caten ory

of claims would include any case in which the
t t eci'

transaction, as dc ined in the Sur

ne Court's

First Amendment

jurisprudene

Th ese four classes of intringement claims all ceed the traditional scope of rights that
-ade marl kowners have in words or symbols, andF re all been criticized as going well beyond
hat is n( cessary to fulfill the purposes of trademc protection.
0
These cas es generally do not
threat n the kinds of ma
ace harm th trademark law was created to prevent. Rathier,
they have generally arisen through misplace d notions of property rights arising from the
fact of investment. While the actions targeted in these cases may enable free riding in so me
instances, or undermine the mark owner's ab ility to control the unique "identity" and imaige

it has constructed for its brand, they generally do not pose meaningful harm to consumers, ,or
consumers' reliance interests in marks, or thre aten direct diversion of trade through mistakcen
purchases.

At the sc rne time, enrorcing rignts in thes eour classes or cases may pose a si
-nairment of societal interests in marh
ice competition develorment of ne

11
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d digital technologies, and First Amendment interests.4 Because they threaten to upse
roper
balance of competing interests, they need a good, hard looking-over, beyond wh
the p
is no rmally required for more "traditional" trademark infringement cases, before relief i s
nted

Because these four classes of claims assert rights that exceed those generally necessary
to protect societal interests in avoiding confusion, and may impair other, competing societal
interests, they should be considered outside the framework of ownership rights in words
or symbols, like residual passing off claims that don't allude to marks or that only entail
use of similar generic words or symbols. Evaluating them as passing off claims, rather than
infringement claims, would hopefully downplay the influence of ownership and investment
and focus the courts instead on the practical impact of the defendant's actions. Outside of
the infringement context, courts should focus more critically on the nature and magnitude of
likely harm arising from the defendant's actions, in light of the surrounding circumstances.

In this less routine evaluation, courts might be encouraged to put the defendant's actions
into a larger context, and evaluate them in light of overall competition interests, their impact
on the parties' and the public's First Amendment interests, and on developing technologies.
These classes of claims are also better evaluated as "passing off" claims because there is more
precedent and flexibility to recognize and apply additic
and other limitations, beyond those imposed in trade ark infringement cases. I will discuss

these filterintDresumptions, defenses, and other limitat ions further in the next subsection.
concerns that courts may refuse to take th in
Michael Grynberg has i
to
make reforms of this natur e, due to trends toward judicial formalism and textu alism.46 This
would be most unfortunat Because the Lanham Act was intended to codify the common
law, courts have played a particularly important role in shaping the causes of a ction the Act
.xpressed

provides.4 Congress has t( nded to follow the courts' lead. Many of Congress', amendments
codified internretations and defenses alreadv c reated hv the
to the Lanham Act have si m
courts.48 Thus, it seems ap)propriate aind well-precedented for cour ts to undertake reform of
the kind I suggest. Indeed , when Con gre ss amended Lanham Act 43(a) in 1988 to codify
the interpretation that cou rts had give:,nto that provision, the Sen ae Report accompanying
the amendment expressly stated an e. ctation that "the courts [ will] continue to interprel
the section."49
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When protection of marks poses special thr eats to competition orfree speech interests

courts have not hesitated to respond with spec ial rules and defenses. For example, in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. SamaraBros.,so the Supreme n.Court responded to competition concerns by
ruling categorically that product feature trade d ress cannot be deemed inherently distinctive,

but must be demonstrated to have acquired seco ndary meaning as a prerequisite to protection.
For the same reasons, several of the Circuits hav e fashioned special standards for determining
likelihood of confusion in product feature infrin gement cases. In light of First Amendment
concerns, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Ci rcui t declined to extend the doctrin( orf initi
interest confusion in Internet cases.5 Several Ci rcui t Courts of A ppeals hav e adopt dA
specia
balancing tests to be applied in infringement claiims involving the titles of e) pressiv works.
Both the Ninth and the Third Circuits have a dor ted express rules or d rfenses to enabl
nominative uses of marks.5 Courts should conti nue to recognize and acc
this responsibili
to maintain the proper balance of interests in La nham Act cases. With re rd to my 0roos
many of the necessary mechanisms are alreadv iin place.
Most mark owners who file suit alleging Lanham Act 32(1)(a) infringement of registered
5arks
also allege violation of 43(a) as a back-up, recognizing that 43(a) covers a wider
trray of passing off claims. Nothing in the Lanha r Act's statutory language itself would
rohibit courts from evaluating the four identified cl asses of infringement claims as causes of

43(a), ev ren if the claims allege infringement of a

iction for passing off under Lanham Act
existered mark.

As originally ent acted , Lanham Act§ 32(1)(a)" provided for infringement liability when a
defendant's use of ,a registered mark was "likely to cause con fusion or mistake or to deceive

purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services .6In 1962, Congress amended
this language to d l
the
Vete
words "purchasers as to the sour ce of origin of such goods or
thus
V se eming to delete the specific requirement that "purchasers" be confused
about the "source" of oods or services. This amendment m ight he construed to authorie
courts to impose li ibi
d confusion oN 'sponsorsh
in cases o
ior
0]
services,"5
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2005); New Kids on the Block v.
7.

interest confusion, bul

or in cases o post-sale or in

on courts to do so.
In 1988, Congress a rnended Lanham
rVz Act
(a) expressly to impose ability on persons
who use (in connection with goods or services) a alse designation of origin, alse or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading rep
confusion, or to cause nistake, or to deceive a

sentation of fact which

is likely to cause

a rne origin, sponsorsnip, or

7 anornet

is
- by another person."59 COng ess undei tool
general rewriting of the 43(a) language ' to codify the interpretation i ha[d] be n
n
by the courts."60 The language makes it cl
that
Varclaims of confusion about "af 111ation

d unde

for
0 exam0e are aDDTOpriai

or "association" (a license or endorsement

Prior to the 1988 am end mnentts, Lanham Act
45 defined a "tradem ark" as "any word,
naime, symbol, or devi ce or any combination ther of adopted and used by a manufacturer
or merchant to identify and dist inguish his goods, including a unique product, from those
monufactured or sold b) oth ers a nd to indicate the ource of the goods, e ven if that source is
un o n.~m While the 1988 billamendedthe aeinitin
oro
a trademark to accommodate the
ne, "i1ntent to use" registration procedures,6 it did not und
to
0ertake
track the changes it mad
language of 43(a)-that is, it did not redefine a t rademark as indicating source o
to
on, connection, association, soonsorshi, or avorov al. This might supoort an argumen1
that Congress intended th claims about licenses, endorsements, and oth
ionships
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Courts could certainly find statutory language, legislative history, and case law to justify
relegating infringement cases to a "passing off" evaluation when the de fendant made
no "trademark use."63 Moreover, while there is no statutory language exp essly limiting
infringement claims to commercial speech or point-of-sale confusion, there is likewise no
express language requiring such claims to be litigated as "infringement" rathe r than passing
off. Courts expanded the infringement cause of action to encompass such cl aims and they
should be able to re-classify them as passing off claims.
DLimitations and Defenses on I issin Of
Having channeled the cases iden

Lssociational Mr

'tied in the prior se(ction in

in
"

q

9

ns
al

me,

associational marketing" evaluation we can focus on th
uation process itself. Th ese
over
xistence of sponsorship or
categories of cases - 1) cases alle ring confusion
th
to00
look to the license for
affiliation (a licensing agreement), v here consumers are un]
information about product quality; 2) cases in which the defendant di d not mc
ide ark
use"; 3) cases relying on initial interest or post-sale confusion; and, 4) cases assert g cl aiims
against statements made in non-commercial speech-assert harms to mark owne rs tha
more indirect and indefinite and less central to the core purposes of trademark l aw, and pose
questionable harm to consumers. For this reason, they are less like ly to justify the potential
impairment they pose to competing interests in marketplace comp etition, First Amendment
interests, and the interest in unfettered development of new digit al marketing Stools. They

should be more carefully scrutinized and subjected to additional limitations and defenses
beyond those imposed against trade marl uses n commercial speech tthat threaten point-of-sale
source/quality c onfusion. The follo vin, subs( ctions discuss particu lar kinds of l imitations or
defenses that sh ould be considered. The v dra wliberally from ideas exnressedb some of the
icipants. Some of them oi
th others.
other Roundtabl
Michael Grynberg has raised the >oint th Lanham Act 33(b) "mal be construed to limi
infringement defenses to those it xpress1 lists.6 He has also cited precedent suggestin
.riiingI

I

I

SUCH

to extend to residual passing of fcl
make monade of these concerns. Tothe
oims.66Iwould
extent that 33(b) limits cour ts' a bility to augment dc enses to nfringement liability, its
prohibition should not extend to a claim for residual p issing off, where the liability does
not turn on the plaintiff's owne rshi p of valid trademark ights. Sect ion 33(b) concerns itself

ar
1.
1115(b)
55. Grynberg, s14
56. Id. at 916-1'
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th rights in tradem ks.
strict
mark," "the registration of the mark,"

rits challenges to "the validity of th e registered
the registrant's ownership of the mar k and
r" "the
registrant's exclusive right to use the re gistered mark in commerce." Since the residual
passing off cause of action provides ights beyond those afforded throug h trademark
ownership or registration, the ownershi p, registration, or validity of the plai ntiff's mark
is essentially irrelevant. Moreover, eve n if courts are disinclined to exten d trademark
infringement- specific defenses (such as abandonment) to residual passing off claims, that
does not prevent them from developing a secially tailored set of defenses to DRSSin2 off/
r

associational marketing claims.

I

Requiremen

Rebecca Tushnet, Mark Lemley, Mark McKenna, Michael Grynberg, and others have
?tdvocated imposing a materiality requtirement in at least some infringement causes of action,

nd this is a sound suggestion. As th Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition suggests
nateriality might be assumed in infrin
rement
actions when a competitor or producer of related
goods uses a mark in a man ner that is likely to confuse consumers about product so)urce(and
by implication, about the p roduct 's quality and characteristics). Indeed, the early common
law imposed an inherent ma [terialitty requirement by limiting the infringement cause of action
to cases involving similar or relate d products and confusion about source.67 Howev er, courts'
subsequent expansion of ac tionab le confusion has left that built-in assurance of mnateriality
along the wayside. When th ielikelly consumer confusion is not about source or resp )onsibility
for product quality, only o ccurs aat times other than the point of purchase, or is not made
in direct, perceptible refere .nceto a product or service that the defendant is mar 'keting (as
in theehnon-t rademnarl use cases), materi anty is not s elf-evident, and the defend int should
be re quired to prove it. As Bob Bone st ressed in the course of the Roundtable, without a
show ing of aterialil y (that is, that the al leged misrep resentation about source, sp onsorship,
or affiliation would b, a substantial facto r in consumer s' purchase decision), there s no harm
from a societal standpoin
hood of harm c arly is a prerequisite to a L inham Act
cause of action.6
a
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extualist regime because
fined in the statutory te,

Imposing a materiality requirement in passing ott/associational marketing cases may p ove
problematic, however. Materiality is generally a matter of consumer perception, mu ich liki .the
likelihood of confusion inquiry. Undertaking to assess the materiality of misrepre:sentat ions
to consumers could augment the length, cost, and complexity of litigation, and t hus further
increase the chilling effect that threats of litigation have on competition and First A]mend ment
interests. Moreover, we may encounter the same kind of feed-back loop with mate riality that
we experience in the likelihood of confusion context. Just as mark owners have convinced
consumers that all third-party uses of marks must be licensed (leading consumers to assume
that any third-party use they encounter therefore is licensed), mark owners may convince
consumers that the existence of a license agreement provides material informa tion about
quality (after all, rules regarding mark abandonment essentially require that ma rk owners
oversee the quality of their licensee's goods,69
rven
if that requirement is rarely enforced).

Mark owners may also argue for an expansive understanding of "materiality"-fo r exe
AQ
that the misrepresentation that a licensing relationship exists is material to cons
because it imparts the licensor's prestige and "personality" to the licensed goods
uabl
psychological boost to the image-conscious consumer.

One response to these poten ial problems mig be to define materiality in a purescriptive,
rather than a descriptive way- that is, make so Uelegal conclusions about wh t should and
should not be deemed material by consumers: qjut, lity factors may be mat(
but prestige
factors may not. Or a SDClllC-Seemin
ucular person or
organization may be ma
hile a more general sug gestion of association with the same
person or organization mnay not In initial-interest confusion cases, materialit y might be judged
not by the substance of the misi epresentation(since the consumer knows th zh
truth by the time
any purchase is made), but by he effort the consumer must undergo to lea ve the defendant's
site and find the plainti ff 's. If a 11 the consumer needs to do is click the "bo ck" button on his
computer and return to his sea rch result, then it might be assumed that h
rwillthat
exend
ted
so
rce
or
affiliation
is
material
to
him
effort if the misrepresen
2. Proximate Ca ust
To some extent, the issue of proximat

d to

the ma

issue, and couldb

assumed in more traditional infringemne nt contexts. (Ihe defendant's use of the mark causes
consumers to be confused and make mistaken purchase decisions, which harms both the
consumers and the mark owner). Howev er, some of the recent Internet cases that dispense with
any meaningful "trademark use" requir ement suggest that more conscious consideration of
proximate cause might be in order. For e xample, when a defendant makes a hidden application
of a mark-deep in proprietary softwar so that consumers are never exposed to or aware of
it- it is hard to see how that hidden use itself causes either confusion or any of the harm that
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confusion might bring. In such cases it is the screen display generated as the result of the
hidden application that should be deemed the proximate cause of any subsequentconsumer
confusion and harm. To put it another way, the application of the mark is merely a means of
getting a message to consumers. It is the message itself that has the capacity to confuse them.
In the Internet context, this distinction may be particularly important, as different entities
may control the means and the message. "Imposing a proximate cause limitation may enable
Internet service providers to use marks to efficiently aggregate and index market information
for consumers, free from the chillin effect of mark owner threats of suit.
Of course, if courts succeed in tur ning their focus away from the defendant's application
of the plaintiff's mark (with all its attendant property and free riding implications) in the
passing off context, and concentrate instead on the larger overall message that is conveyed
to consumers, that should also help to fix liability on the proximate cause of any injurious
confusion.

3. The Likelihood of Confusion Dc
Courts should
"associational m
of trademark law.

nination

[so conside idjusting tV
luation in these
ihood of confusion
ing cases, given r
n1ore tangentiareationsmp to m
rcore concerns
in, the Roundtable
:icivants discussed some useful aporoaches.

r a roach would be to raise the necessary showing of likely confusion beyond what has
One
been req ull ed in more mainstream "trademark use in commercial speech causing a likelihood
of point -of -sale confusion about source/quality " cases. Instead of accepting survey evidence
demons1 ing that 10-15% of consumers may be confused, impose a higher thresh old, such
as a ma) ity of consumers. This would be just ified, given that the potential harm c aused by
the confusion is more uestionable, and theV otential damage caused by overprot ection is
greater by comparison
nother app roach might e mbrace a rmore prescripti ve (as opposed to descripti ve) standard
ourts could create presur rptions that
ol measuring likelihood of consumer confusion.
cei in oro-cor a1etitive or e xoressive actions are un kely to cause confusion. Over time.
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such presumptions may assist to shape consumer perceptions, so that they are less likely to rely
on those presumptively non-confusing actions for material information. Bill McGeveran has
advocated creating statutory "safe harbors" that would simply exempt certain uses of marks
from liability, regardless of likelihood of confusion. Other Roundtable members expressed
concern that carving out specific exceptions or defenses to infringement may lead to further
doctrinal creep, encouraging courts to find actionable all uses that are not within the stated
scope of the exception or defense. Counterbalancing these concerns, express carve-outs would
reduce the cost and length of litigation and might discourage chilling threats of litigation in
cases in which the defendant's actions arguably fall within the carve-out. I would advocate a
judicially created irrebuttable presumption that actions consisting of non-commercial speech
cause no actionable likelihood of confusion. As McGeveran notes, the harm that relief would
pose to free speech interests would almost always outweigh the harm the allegedly infringing
speech poses to trademark interests. And to the extent that there are exceptions to this general

rule, the administrative costs of finding them will outweigh the value of doing so. During
Roundtable discussions, Rebecca Tushnet emphasized how defamation and false advertising
law tolerate false speech. Adopting a per se rule that occasionally permits such false speech in
the associational marketing cases seems equally acceptable in the interest of promoting First

Amendment values.74
Perhaps more central to my own proposal in this article, courts should not focus on the
similarity of the parties' marks when evaluating likelihood of consumer confusion in passing
off/associational marketing cases. The emphasis should not be on the defendant's use of "the
plaintiff 's" word or symbol, because the claim seeks relief beyond the scope of rights afforded
by trademark ownership-it asserts rights in the absence of the defendant's trademark use,
or for kinds of confusion that are not central to the core concerns of trademark law, or do not
directly lead to mistaken purchases. Rather, courts should consider the total context in which
consumers receive the defendant's alleged misrepresentation. In particular, if the defendant's
moduct has other source indicators associated with it. courts should consider the arnelioratin

effect that their pr esence might have. Courts should also consider any other confusionenhancing or mitiga ing influences, such as product packaging, or a descriptive or nominative
context. If it appe rs that the defendant was attempting merely to describe its own goods,
compare them to th e plaintiff's, or explain how they might be used with the plaintiff's, for
tI

that non- actionable messa ge to consumers (much as courts have routinely pi esumed Ph,
if the def endant undertoo to confuse consumers it succeeded in doing so). P articularl n
cases lack ing traditional "t rademark use" by the defe ndant, courts should consid Pr
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a series of sf
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ases.
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consumers are t o associate the defendant's actions with p roducts or serv ices the def rdant
is marketing, or to rely on them for information about pro duct source or affiliation. And if
consumers enco unter the defendant's reference to the mark in non-comme cial speech, courts
should critically evaluate the likelihood that they will under rstand
that refe rce to ident
source or affiliat ion of the defendant's products or services.

rould also be very helpful t c draw courts' atte ntion to literature describing e results
of cog nitive behavior and literary theory research re garding how consumers actual
react to
marks in various settings.Some ol the RoundtableI participants have already made yood use
of this new source of information. These studies m ay counteract some of the moi extreme
conce rns

of trademark owners.

Limited Remedies
Finally, courts should cultivate more limited remedies in associational marketing cases, and
avoid outright injunctions against all use of confusing words and symbols. As several of the

Roundtable participants remarked, threats of litigation made through cease and desist letters
may pose greater harm to competition and free speech interests than do the results in litigated
cases. If mark owners are less certain of fully enjoining unauthorized uses of their marks, they
may be less inclined to litigate, and thus less likely to challenge such uses through cease and
desist
rs.
In many cases, a disclaimer should be sufficient to protect consumer reli ance interests. AS

Laura Heyman has noted,7 it is unclear why courts have been hesitant to r ely on disclaimers
to address Lanham Act harms, given how much reliance the law plac es on disclaimers
and warnings in other contexts, such as product liability cases. Particular ly when potential
confusion harm is indirect or relatively minor, requiring a disclaimer, in l ieu

the defendant's use may movide a beneficial comnromise ofcomnetin
certainly precedent for this
roach
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rights in marks and emphasize their inr stm nt in converting "marks" into "brands."
Focusing on rights against passing off, i
cu of rights in trademarks may encourage courts
to give greater weight to consumer intere sts and(concerns, and to more actively consider and
weigh the purported harm posed by man y unaut horized uses of marks. A passing off context
provides greater leeway to consider the cc llective impact of all the circumstances surrounding
the defendant's alleged misrepresentatio n, to int roduce limiting doctrines of materiality and
proximate cause, and to consider more demandi ng standards of likely consumer confusion,
that better reflect the manitude of Doten tial ha min such cases and the Dotential for damaae
to com

reting
m

ice interests.

While courts may be more focused on a textual analysis of Lanham Act claims today
than they have been in the past, my proposal may provide courts some comfort through its
consistency with the Act's statutory language and its fit within a long-accepted common law
"residual" category of passing off claims. It re
minds us that the Lanham Act has never been

solely focused on ownership of marks, and t hat when passing off is at issue, rather than
a traditional trademark infringement claim, th ere is historical precedent for more careful

scrutinv.
Ine propose
pass
asociational marketing cause of action is no panacea: it would
be far better if the infringement cause of action had not expanded to such a point that it requires
drastic counteraction. Judicial-driven reforms are messy and inconsistent, and there is no

guarantee that negative reactions to "free riding" won't find their way into courts' passing off
analysis, as they have in infringement claims." But the danger of that seems less severe than
in the "trademark right" context, and the passing off cause of action should prove flexible
enough to bring in countervailing concerns to moderate the anti-free-riding instincts. Courts
might encounter the most difficult issue, from a litigation standpoint, in making the initial

cut-deciding which claims fall into the delineated categories of "associational marketing"

claims and thus should he channeled into anassinI off analysis. My ownnreference would he
to over-include
are subject to t
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